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Integrity and Dialogue 
Simon Robinson
This paper explores the relationship of dialogue to integrity. It sets out a traditional philosophical 
view of integrity, noting that these are predominantly assertive, holding certain principles or 
values against others, and therefore they do not involve dialogue. Based on more recent views 
on integrity, which stress agency, the paper then develops a view of integrity based on a three-
fold view of responsibility. This view is based on dialogue, and with that a greater engagement 
with plural values and a complex social environment. The paper looks at the nature of that 
dialogue, and then goes on to examine implications for the practice and theory of dialogue itself. 
The paper uses illustrations from the Mid Staffs Hospital Trust case and from fiction, with the 
example of Shakespeare’s Henry V.
The Importance of Integrity
There is a consensus amongst academics and practitioners on the importance of 
integrity. A survey by the Council for Industry and Higher Education (Archer and 
Davidson 2008), for instance, suggests that the third most important quality that 
employers want in new employees, behind team work and communication skills, 
is integrity. This theme is taken up by the Institute of Chartered Accountancy in 
England and Wales (ICAEW) in Reporting with Integrity (2009), which aims to 
establish the utility of integrity. Integrity, it is argued, provides the basis for the 
establishment of trust, both in leadership and in the wider profession. This is true at 
both the individual and institutional levels (cf. Solomon 2007) and is embodied in 
corporation or individual practice, or in the commitment of the wider profession. 
Hence, the engineering professions (Armstrong et al 1999), for instance, can write 
of the need to maintain the integrity of the profession. By extension, it is argued, 
this leads to the reliability of information and judgement, upon which the future of 
markets, financial systems and even financial policies depend. The absence of this 
was exemplified in the credit crisis (Lanchester 2010).
Defining Integrity 
Pinning down the actual meaning of the term integrity is less easy. The ICAEW 
report acknowledges that promoting integrity is difficult, not least because it seems 
to be a relative concept. Hence, four different major philosophical approaches to 
integrity are reviewed: self-integration; identity; moral purpose; and commitment.
Simon Robinson is Professor of Applied and Professional Ethics, Faculty of Business and Law, 
Leeds Becket University. 
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Self-integration 
This account of integrity suggests that it is about the integration of what Frankfurt 
refers to as higher order and lower order volitions (Frankfurt 1961). Higher order 
volitions are about long term desires, and lower order volitions immediate desires. 
He distinguishes the high order volition of the drug addict to be a drug free person, 
and the lower order volition to take drugs. Integrity, and with that free will, argues 
Frankfurt, is achieved when the lower order volitions cohere with the higher order 
volitions, bringing together volition and action. This can also be seen in terms 
of developing a holistic integration of the self that brings together the cognitive, 
affective and physical aspects of the person (Solomon 2007). 
Identity
Williams (1973) argues for a view of integrity that is based on the identity of the 
person. This is part of his argument against a simple, utilitarian approach. One 
example that he offers is of the dignitary who is the guest of a foreign nation. He is 
taken to a town square, where 20 people are about to be killed in reprisal for recent 
armed protests. As a significant guest, the man is offered the opportunity to kill one 
of the 20, allowing the other 19 to live. The utilitarian response would be straight 
forward, that by killing the one man he saves 19, and therefore he should do it. 
Williams, however, argues that this is more than a simple calculation. It involves 
going against the moral identity of the person, going against the core moral beliefs 
that make up the identity of the person. 
Whilst this is an important part of integrity, one that demands careful reflection 
on what the basic values are, it is not clear that it is sufficient. Like self-integration, 
it suffers from the problem that the morality at the base of identity may itself be 
flawed or questionable. The recent film In Bruges (2009) is a good example of this. 
The leader of a criminal gang has strong belief on the wrongness of killing children. 
To allow one of his ‘hit-men’ to live after he has killed a child, albeit by mistake, 
would go against this belief, which he takes to be part of his identity. However, 
the moral context of the practice is itself questionable, because his very business is 
based on killing. This is ultimately tested for him when he believes that he too has 
killed a child and, without further thought, he kills himself. Hence, he remains a 
man of integrity but only within a flawed moral boundary.
Moral Purpose
In the light of this, writers like Rawls (1972) and Halfon (1989) argue that integrity 
must include an acceptable moral purpose at its basis. For Rawls, this would involve 
some clear conception of justice, defined in terms of fairness. Halfon is more 
circumspect and careful. He argues that integrity involves the person setting out 
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an ethical perspective that is conceptually clear, logically consistent, appraised or 
relevant empirical evidence, and careful about acknowledging, as well as weighing 
the relevant moral considerations. In effect, Halfon argues that the person of 
integrity will give a clear account of their moral purpose as part of following a 
rigorous moral decision making process. 
Such arguments provide a view of integrity that is descriptive, but not a normative 
view, and hence they are still not sufficient. Tested by the example of the SS guard, 
the guard may well be able to give an account of moral purpose which he claims is 
coherent, based on a world view which was quasi-religious. The SS guard lacks two 
things, and both are needed for any account of integrity. The first involves openness 
to the critical questioning of different perspectives, including competing values, 
raising the possibility that the leadership and the core values of the group can be 
challenged. The second demands a normative stance, recognising that some things 
are wrong in themselves. Underlying the Williams case is precisely the normative 
view that it is wrong to kill another person, whatever the consequences. Underlying 
the self-justification of the SS guard is the lack of a normative stance, such as respect 
for human dignity1.
Commitment
Calhoun (1995) argues for a sense of commitment which is about ‘standing 
for something’. He argues that this involves more than simply standing for an 
individual moral purpose but, rather, standing for a purpose that is recognised 
by the community. Hence, the basis for integrity is recognised. Here, integrity is 
associated explicitly with something for which it is worth striving, and it assumes 
a degree of courage and perseverance that will enable the person and the group 
to stand up against internal and societal pressures that impose obstacles to the 
purpose. However, much like the other arguments this has limitations, not least 
because it may involve standing up for something that means much to one group 
or community, but which is actually seen as problematic by communities outside. 
The point about normativity, above, is that it looks to a moral view which is not 
determined by the group but, rather, that transcends it (Mason 2001).
None of these approaches, then, are sufficient in themselves. Hence, the ICAEW 
report suggests that these partial approaches contain elements that can come 
together in a more coherent description of integrity, with five core aspects:
•	Moral values. This demands clear thinking about what they are.
1 Despite this, Cohen (2001) notes the lengths to which some Nazi officials went to 
articulate a perverted view of respect for the dignity of their victims, e.g., that children 
should not be shot, whilst holding them by their hair.
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•	Motives. These demand an awareness of motives and the capacity to test 
them in the self and others.
•	Commitments. This involves sustaining commitment to others, and to 
values, over a long period.
•	Qualities. These involve the virtues necessary to maintain integrity.
•	Achievements. The need to integrate moral purpose with practice, 
walking the walk. 
In turn, they argue that these elements lead to the key behavioural characteristics of 
integrity. Being honest and truthful are behaviours that emerge from moral values. 
Fairness and compliance with the law are behaviours that emerge from motives. 
Commitment involves the promotion of community interests. Qualities include 
being open and adaptable, and the capacity to take corrective action. The behaviour 
of consistency arises from achievements. 
Integrity, Identity and Dialogue 
The attempt to develop a comprehensive view of integrity begins to deal with some 
of the issues, but it leaves other tensions unresolved. Integrating different aspects of 
the self, for instance, pays little attention to how the person, and their underlying 
view of the self, deals with difference. Even the idea of the self that is largely implicit 
in Williams’ account (1973), is hard to pin down. Polonius’s advice to his son to 
be true to the self, for instance, presumes a settled self to which one can relate in a 
consistent way (Hamlet 1, 3).2 In turn, this presumes that one can know the self. 
However, research on ethics and pedagogy (Robinson and Dowson 2011) suggests 
that it is hard for people to determine if one has integrity, precisely because such 
a judgement cannot be made purely by the self. There are many aspects of the 
self that one does not know, and which can only be discovered through relating 
to others, and by hearing their views (Luft 1969). Fawkes (2014), in examining 
professional ethics in Jungian terms, argues that it is important for professions to 
develop reflexivity which takes in the ‘shadow side’. This is not necessarily a malign 
aspect of the self, or of the identity of the organisation, but simply of aspects of the 
self which are not examined and which require the help of others to see them. 
This thinking suggests that integrity is less an individual and more of a social virtue, 
to do with how individuals and organisations view their identity and present their 
identity. Mason (2001) suggests that this begins to focus on the development 
of critical reflexivity (Giddens 1991, Bauman 1989) and thus on moral agency. 
This removes us from the idea that integrity is somehow quantifiable, or about a 
claim to some sort of moral perfection, and moves us to a dynamic, relational and 
2 Shakespeare, of course, sees Polonius’s comment as a sententious maxim.
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developmental view of integrity. 
Integrity, in traditional views, is very much about the assertion of a moral 
perspective over/against another, often leading to a moral perspective which is itself 
adversarial. Pattison and Edgar (2011) argue that an extreme example of this is 
whistle-blowing, and that the identity of the whistle-blower often precisely avoids 
the complexity of an institutional situation, and seeks to polarise relations. There is 
little here about dialogue with different narratives. Often, for instance, the narrative 
of institutional sustainability is seen as either being value neutral, or against moral 
values, something that is reinforced by MacIntyre’s view of institutional values as 
being secondary to the core values of the community of practice (MacIntyre 1981). 
However, without both it is hard to see how the core values and their community 
or practice can be sustained (Robinson and Smith 2014).  
This moves integrity beyond individual reflexivity and responsiveness, towards a 
more social view, and thus demands a more complex view that is focused on the 
practice of dialogue, which engages all the value narratives in the social environment, 
both individual and social. Critically engaging different value narratives in dialogue 
does not necessarily lead to the loss of moral meaning, but rather to a more complex 
view of responsibility than simply agency, one that involves ongoing multiple 
dialogues, and dialogues that engage both affective and cognitive meaning. 
Responsibility 
I have suggested (2009) three interrelated modes of responsibility, the first two of 
which originate in Aristotle’s thinking: imputability, accountability and liability.
Imputability
This is about moral agency, being able to attribute ideas, values and actions 
to a person or group. The strongest version of this suggests a rational decision 
making process. Taylor (1989) argues that this decision-making constitutes a 
strong valuation that connects action to deep decision making. This owning of the 
thoughts, and the related decision making, is what constitutes the moral agency of 
the person or group. Hence, this process of decision making becomes key to the 
development of a sense of identity. In effect, this involves part of the constitution 
of the self (Korsgaard 2009).
Closely connected to this is the concept of moral or retrospective responsibility 
that focuses on blame for actions. This seeks to identify the person or persons 
who are responsible for actions. Key to this are either intentionality or role. The 
first determines whether an action was intended, and thus who was responsible. 
The second, role responsibility, suggests that certain roles are focused in purpose 
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(notably leadership, professional, or family roles), and thus may apportion blame, 
even if consequences were not intended. A medical practitioner, for instance, may 
be deemed to be responsible for a patient’s death, even if he did not intend it.
Key to the development of this agency is the development of responsibility for 
ideas, values, worth and practice, all of which take moral agency into a relational 
and holistic context: 
•	 Ideas. This demands clarity about the concepts that are used, and the 
capacity to justify them rationally. We can hardly be said to be responsible 
for our thoughts if we cannot provide some account of, and justification 
for, them. Core to this is an understanding of purpose. Any account and 
justification of thoughts and actions also demands openness to critical 
intellectual challenge. In the 2008 credit crisis, this was illustrated by the 
use of CDOs (collateralised debt obligations) involving the repackaging 
of mortgage debts and selling them on. As Lanchester (2010) notes, 
those who pursued this policy based it on a mathematical formula that 
none of them understood. Their focus was purely on the profits that this 
action would make. This, in turn, was based on values which radically 
affected how they saw the world 
•	Values. This demands the capacity to appreciate values underlying 
thoughts and action. It is not just that they are coherent, it is also that 
they have distinct meaning and value, such that one prefers one practice 
to others. Even at this stage, responsibility involves a comparison with 
other practices and their values (Taylor 1989). Hence, deciding upon 
one’s own values, or the values of the organisation, does not take place 
in social isolation, or apart from the core relationships to the social and 
physical environment. 
•	Worth. Underlying any idea of values is the idea of worth. The worth 
of a professional organisation, for instance, is expressed centrally in 
what Airaksinen (1994) refers to as the pre-moral values, such as health 
(medical profession), justice (legal profession) or learning (education 
profession). These are all values which can be connected back to a vision 
of what it means to be human, and thus to any idea of human flourishing. 
By definition, this takes such organisations beyond the narrow interests 
of their group and sets the value of the profession, and their members, 
in shared values, and in the ways they relate to wider social and physical 
environments.
Critically, this strong sense of worth is central to identity and is directly 
focused on feelings and emotions. Hence, taking responsibility for the 
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affective aspects of the self is also key to agency. In terms of the affective 
self, Rowan Williams (1989) makes the distinction between emotions 
and feeling. Emotion involves feeling, which intrudes and controls the 
person. Anxiety or shame, for instance, can be felt so intensely that the 
person responds to them without understanding their genesis or how 
they are influencing her. Inevitably, with such emotion, the boundaries 
of the self are felt as being indistinct and insecure. This is contrasted 
with dispassionate feeling, which involves an engagement with feelings 
which allows an exposure of the self, ‘freed from all compulsions to keep 
itself safe or keep itself under control’ (Williams 1989, 11). It involves 
learning about those feelings and accepting them, hence, as Williams 
puts it, learning a positive form of detachment. This links both to 
personal and professional integrity. 
Narrow views of self-worth, focused on closed groups, tend to be 
dominated by emotion and by the impulse to distinguish the worth of 
the groups from that of those outside the group (Cohen 2001), losing 
any sense of service to the wider society. Energies are thus focused on 
location (demonstrating one’s place), rather than on engagement with 
the wider world (Markham 2003). This affective aspect of agency is 
central to identity and thus to any view of integrity. Hence, greater focus 
is required on the psychological aspects of integrity than was previously 
seen in philosophy. This provides ways to examine integrity in relation to 
self and other deception, intentional or unconscious, and to mechanisms 
of denial (Cohen 2001). It also suggests that any descriptive view of 
integrity requires the capacity not simply to challenge values, but also 
the wider and deeper personal and organisational visions of relationships 
to society. This applies as much to those who perceive themselves to be 
morally upright as to those who argue for a more instrumental identity 
(Pattison and Edgar 2011). It also suggests that the perspectives of the 
wider society will be affected by the individual or group sense of worth, 
partly because of the danger of polarised thinking.
•	Practice: At the heart of this focus is the awareness of one’s actions and 
the effects of those actions on the social and environmental context. In 
business, for instance, if you are a board member, do you fully understand 
the practice of an organisation and the effect that this might have on 
the wider social and physical environment? None of this prescribes a 
particular response. What it does demand is an awareness of what one 
is doing; how that fits into the purpose of the organisation, and how 
that effects the internal and external environments. The physicality 
of practice is also value laden, not least because, as David Ford notes, 
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all action involves communication (Ford 1999). Somatic awareness is 
found at the base of the earliest stages of human development (Stern 
1985, 129). 
This first mode of responsibility, which is basically moral agency, sounds 
very simple but in practice it is difficult and complex. The ongoing 
dialogue applies to the individual and the organisation. The self, 
suggests Taylor (1989, see also Cooper-White 2007), is neither uniform 
nor singular, but is made up of plural narratives, focused on different 
relationships over time: familial, cultural, educational, and so on. Often 
these narratives control the perspective and practice of the individual 
precisely because no practice of internal dialogue has been developed, 
and with that, there is little self-awareness. 
In this view of integrity, the nature of dialogue does not involve an ‘easy fit’ of 
values. On the contrary, as I suggest, it demands critical reflection, the engagement 
of complexity, and the awareness of, and the capacity to respond to, the relationships 
which constitute our social and environmental context and worth. This is messy and 
about ongoing dialogue, focused on mutual support and challenge. This ongoing 
dialogue cannot simply be contained in ‘internal dialogue’, precisely because the 
plural person is focused on relationships that are developed over time, and that 
therefore require dialogue beyond the person and the organisation. This leads into 
the explicit dialogue of accountability.
Accountability
In one sense, accountability is the public face of agency. A lot of the stress in moral 
agency is about making sense to oneself. Accountability is about making sense to 
others. Focused on answerability and judgement, the term is often seen as being 
narrow and pressed into frameworks of power. Hence, many debates either want 
to focus accountability on the immediate context of management, or to rail against 
it as a means to control individuals (Sternberg 2000). Typically, however, there are 
different kinds of accountability which relate to the different strands of the social 
and physical environment. In the work place there is accountability to superiors, 
customers, colleagues, which is focused on value narratives, which include 
competency but also human rights at work. This suggests that accountability is 
key to how we operate in the world and respond to the demands of the social and 
physical environments. It also suggests that, at this point, integrity is focused on 
multiple accountability, and how that is fulfilled. Perhaps the best example of this is 
the professional ‘model’ of accountability (cf. Armstrong et al), which is minimally 
based on accountability to clients, the profession (including foundational pre-moral 
goods, such as health and well-being), related professions (critical to the on-going 
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work of one’s profession, such as nursing to medicine), the particular institution/
organisation in which one is based, wider society (in relation to provision which is 
focused on service, such as the law or medicine), and future generations (who may 
use the bridge you have built). In many cases this will also include the government.
Giving such an account inevitably involves engagement in ongoing plural, critical 
and mutual dialogue. The very fact that a profession may be accountable to many 
different stakeholders sets up this dynamic of mutuality. Hence, architects and 
engineers, doctors and nurses, are all mutually accountable, and in different ways, 
to clients (who may be complex), regulatory bodies, and so on. Often, integrity, 
and with that any trust, is seen as being based on transparency, defined largely 
in terms of reporting mechanisms. However, as O’Neill (2000) argues, such 
transparency is not sufficient to enable trust. Rather critical dialogue is demanded 
precisely to test the veracity of the reporting and to guard against intentional or 
unintentional deception. Without that, the reporting involves a presentation of self 
and organisational identity which lacks rigour and which negatively affects practice. 
Critical and mutual dialogue is precisely what was missing in the great crises of 
governance and leadership over the past two decades.
The Mid Staffs Hospital Case (Robinson and Smith 2014) showed governance that 
was focused on a narrow view of accountability, focused on targets and, ultimately, 
on a narrative and associated sense of worth and identity that focused on hierarchy, 
eventually with accountability to the government. The result was an inability to see 
multiple accountabilities, even to the extent of affecting how the professions saw 
their work relationships, obscuring the particular needs of patients, and leading 
to the unnecessary deaths of over two hundred. Professional relationships were 
strongly hierarchical and dominated by a culture of fear, which caused a lack of 
focus on core social values, a lack of awareness of the surrounding needs, and a 
limited sense of self-worth, which amounted to worth based on the capacity to fulfil 
targets. There was a virtual absence of critical dialogue between the professions and 
the clients, and between the professions and the managerial hierarchy. The dynamic 
of fear precisely meant that the different groups could not be genuinely held to 
account through openness to critical dialogue, leading to an absence of integrity. 
Nonetheless, a narrow view of accountability was claimed by many players in terms 
of their achieving targets for better financial status, and reporting related to that. 
An inability to critically engage with all the different narratives of care led to 
practice in nursing, for example, which was antithetical to their core professional 
identity as carers, something about which the nurses were shocked. In effect, 
by focusing on giving an account of targets, this led to a lack of accountability, 
both to the profession and to the patient. Hence, the Chief Nurse of the UK felt 
obliged to explicitly revisit the narratives of care and compassion (see Robinson and 
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Smith 2014, 279 ff.). Accountability focused on dialogue, then, is also key to the 
development of identity and, with that, to integrity. The same problems were there 
in the so called regulatory bodies, who were unable to account for why they did not 
make their suspicions about the Mid Staffs Hospital clearer (Robinson and Smith 
2014). They saw the problems but had no sense of mutual accountability. 
Accountability, then, is essentially focused on ongoing dialogue and communication. 
This is partly because relationships and related purpose focus on action, which itself 
acts as a means of integration, and partly because critical dialogue enables better, 
more responsive, integrated thinking and action. Where accountability is focused 
primarily on representation, with little reference to critical dialogue, internal or 
external, or on narrow relationships, we run the danger of unthinking report, and 
of the inability to actually perceive the wider social and environmental context. 
Liability for
Moral liability (as distinct from legal liability) goes beyond accountability, into the 
idea of wider responsibility for projects, people or place. Each person or group has 
to work these out in context, without necessarily an explicit contract. Working that 
out demands awareness of the limitations of the person or organisation, avoiding 
taking on too much responsibility, and a capacity to work together with others 
and to negotiate and share responsibility. Most relationships involve a mixture of 
accountability and liability. A good example is a doctor, who is both accountable for 
and to the patient. Once again this can have a strictly legal sense, or a wider moral 
one, encompassing the broadest possible view of stakeholders, from those directly 
affected by any business or project to the social and natural environment in which 
these operate. Like accountability, this often involves multiple responsibilities, 
which have to be held together. 
This is the most difficult of all the modes of responsibility, partly because of the 
difficulty in determining just what we are responsible for. At one extreme of this 
responsibility lies the constant denier, always finding ways to avoid responsibility. 
At the other extreme sits the person or organisation who tries to take responsibility 
for everything. Aristotle’s stress on the mean suggests that disaster lies in both those 
extremes. In the middle lies a view of liability where responsibility is negotiated. The 
negotiation of responsibility itself is also key to the articulation and development 
of identity, as Finch and Mason (1994) found in researching the negotiation of 
responsibility in families. They noted that the single parent families they worked 
with did not determine their ethical identity through reference to values or 
principles, but through negotiating how responsibility could be shared.
This moves to the idea of shared responsibility for people, project and planet, focusing 
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on shared creativity and responsiveness. This acts as a basis for integrative thinking 
and action, which once more acts as a means of account. Like accountability, it 
has to link to moral agency if it is to make sense - in this case, shared sense. Once 
again, this aspect of responsibility does not allow us to sit back uncritically. There 
will always be healthy questions about how responsibility might have been better 
fulfilled (as distinct from neurotic questions that allow no rest). Some of the great 
post-Holocaust thinkers, such as Arendt, Levinas, Bauman, and Ricoeur, argue 
from this for a sense of universal responsibility - shared responsibility for everything. 
Jonas (1984) takes this further, arguing for a sense of ultimate accountability to, 
and responsibility for, future generations and the environment, a secular analogue 
of the ultimate accountability to God and for His creation. The idea of universal 
responsibility does not involve literal individual moral responsibility for everyone 
and every act, but its power is in engaging the moral imagination, focusing back on 
our ideas, actions and values, with questions on how these might best be fulfilled. 
For instance, do we take full responsibility for what we say? One Turkish thinker, 
Fethullah Gülen (see Yavuz 2013), argues that whatever is said individually, or in 
the role of leader or board, may have unintended consequences, if not immediately, 
then over time. It may influence the tone of a corporation, or the aspirations of 
a community, either negatively or positively. Gülen’s point is that the sense of 
wider responsibility forces us back to the immediate responsibility for the way in 
which we perceive the world and communicate the associated values and ideas. 
Integrity, in the light of this mode of responsibility, is critically about always going 
the extra mile. If the mode of accountability involves responsibility which is ‘both/
and’, accountable in different ways to different relationships, the idea of universal 
responsibility takes on an inclusive sense of responsibility. In Judaeo-Christian 
terms, this is agape, a view of care which includes even the enemy (Author 2001). 
Mason (2001) argues that such inclusive respect for the dignity of the person is 
implicit in such responsibility. 
Complex Integrity and Dialogue 
These interconnected modes of responsibility provide a far more complex view of 
integrity, one which holds together: agency; relational awareness and responsiveness; 
plural narratives, and the values and awareness of a good which transcends narrow 
boundaries. Consistency associated with integrity is found in the consistent 
practice of reflexivity, accountability and creative practice, and in engagement with 
the holistic aspects of the different relationships. The interconnectivity of the three 
modes is vital, not least because if any of the modes is used exclusively it can lead to 
polarisation. The Mid Staffs case exemplifies how a focus on accountability, without 
consideration of the core values, worth and purpose, or of wider responsibility, 
leads to reporting which is focused on narrow value narratives and which involves a 
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lack of awareness of the wider social environment.3 Dialogue is central to this view 
of responsibility and thus to any view of integrity. The nature of dialogue focused 
on complex integrity, has, however, implications for dialogue theory in general, and 
I will outline these now.
First, this suggests that dialogue does not simply involve different parties sharing 
their particular views with each other. Rather, integrity involves the capacity to 
reflect, to evaluate practice, to be able to cope with criticism and to maintain, 
develop or alter practice appropriately. Hence, integrity is best viewed in terms 
of a continual learning process (Author 2011) with the person discovering more 
about the different aspects of the self and others and how these connect. This links 
closely to Jung’s idea of the shadow side (Fawkes 2014). Integrity involves reflection 
on that shadow side, and thus providing space and time for that. Dialogue, in 
this light, involves hearing different voices, and through engaging those different 
narratives, finding one’s own voice (cf. Oakshott 1989, Freire 1996). Far from 
dialogue that simply involves finding common perspectives or values (so often 
stressed in interfaith dialogue), this view stresses the importance of hearing and 
interrogating difference, thus enabling mutual challenge and development. As 
Bauman (1989) argues, in this context, learning requires external perspectives, 
something that applies to the development of agency in the individual and the 
organisation. Agency, in this sense, thrives on difference and dissonance. Lederach 
(2005), in the context of peace building, argues for the systematic scepticism of the 
other and of possible projects, precisely to enable difference to emerge and so the 
reality of the particular other. Acceptance of the other, and an awareness of how the 
other connects to the wider social web, is, of course, equally important in enabling 
the other to emerge. However, acceptance of the other does not a priori demand 
that all values are held in common. 
Second, such learning is therefore distinct from the Habermasian (1992) or 
Kantian dialogue project, which seek to come to agreement on values and ideas. 
Rather, integrity demands a more complex dynamic, involving: holding different 
values together, often linking values associated with core purpose, such as pre-moral 
values; and an awareness of key moral values which transcend project or profession, 
and which need to be prioritised. In the first of these, the value of care, for instance, 
has to be held in tension with organisational sustainability, amongst many other 
factors. This was exemplified in the Mid Staffs case. We cannot afford to lose 
either justice or organisational sustainability. In the second, values and principles 
3 This is often referred to as ‘instrumental rationality’ (Bauman 1989), a focus on the 
management of ends rather than core values. Elsewhere, I argue that, in fact, there is still 
not an absence of value involved, but rather a narrow value base, unaware of the many 
different values in the situation (Author 2013). 
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are focused on views of humanity and, ultimately, are founded in respect for the 
dignity of the person (Mason 2001). Integrity, in this case, demands that anything 
which goes against such dignity demands that the person or organisation stand out 
against it. A good example of the absence of this is the Abu Ghraib case, where 
several army doctors worked with torturers to examine victims and pass them fit for 
further interrogation (Author 2011).4
Third, integrity focuses on holistic engagement  This leads to holistic thinking 
that takes account of how the feelings, thoughts and physicality affect each other, 
enabling thinking that is affective and feeling that is cognitive, both of which can 
be challenged, and are challenged by exposure to the diverse social environment, 
and the different  narratives of that environment. None of this is holism in the 
sense of smooth integration or wholeness. On the contrary, it involves continued 
struggle, not least because, as Pianalto (2012 cf. Cottingham 2010) argues, 
different value narratives are held in place by affect, sometimes providing strong 
motivation to avoid even critical reflection on the different narratives. This moves 
away from Habermas’s (1992) stress on rationality in dialogue. The framework of 
holism rather suggests that rationality cannot be viewed or developed apart from 
engagement with the affect. Solomon (2007) argues that this is not simply about 
controlling the affect, but also about understanding feelings, such as anger, so that 
they can be appropriately articulated.
A good example of this is found in dialogue in Shakespeare’s Henry V. Henry begins 
his dialogue with the Lord Chief Justice (Henry IV pt. 2, 5.2) aware that the Chief 
Justice is afraid of what the new king will do to the man who took Falstaff and 
Henry, as Prince of Wales, to task. Instead, Henry addresses the anxiety and does 
it in such a way that he demonstrates his respect for the Justice and the need for 
good governance, but also establishes core boundaries of governance. ‘My voice’, 
says Henry, ‘shall sound as you do prompt my ear / And I will stoop and humble 
my intents / To your well-practiced wise decision’ (5.2.4). All of this skillfully 
links into previous narratives, disputes and dialogues by using the term ‘father’ 
in reference to the Lord Chief Justice: ‘You will be as a father to my youth’. At 
once, this links to Henry’s final dialogue with his father. That dialogue had begun 
to resolve a relationship between father and son that had been made difficult by 
the additional power relationship of king and heir (Henry IV pt. 2). It could only 
focus on the succession by first focusing on the effect of the crown upon Henry’s 
father. The resolution of that relationship was focused both on empathy (expressed 
by the prince for his father) and on the practice of kingship. Such a resolution now 
4 One UK medical practitioner was later struck off the medical register by the UK General 
Medical Council for lack of moral courage in not reporting abuse in this context (http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-20809692).
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enables the new king to establish another fatherly relationship, and to put away the 
associations with Falstaff (who is himself seen by some as a negative father figure). 
Fourth, the issue of holism leads to a focus on virtues in dialogue. The practice 
of open and critical dialogue precisely leads to the development of responsibility. 
It enables the development of agency, demanding the articulation of ideas, values 
and practice, which clarifies both what we think and do. Articulation, and the 
development of narrative, becomes essential for reflection and learning, involving 
ongoing hermeneutics. It also enables a fuller awareness of the social environment, 
and better appreciation of the worth in relation to the self and others. Dialogue 
also demands the development of commitment to the self and the other. It is not 
possible to pursue dialogue without giving space and time for it to develop, and this, 
in turn, demands a non-judgmental attitude. Commitment to the self and others 
is also essential if the potential critique of values and practice is to emerge from 
articulation and reflection. Dialogue itself also sets up a continued accountability 
with those involved. This is partly because it sets up a contract, formal or informal, 
that establishes expectations that are, in turn, continually tested by that dialogue. 
It also involves being open to plural voices and how they relate to core meaning. 
The practice of such responsibility also involves the practice of virtues, intellectual 
and moral. Reflection on ideas, values, worth and practice, for instance, involves a 
deepening of the intellectual virtue of phronesis, practical wisdom that focuses on 
how the good can be embodied, but also on what the good actually is in relation 
to the social context. Listening to the different narratives, in the self and others, 
and working through worth, as well as values, demands the exercise of empathy. 
Developing creative responsibility demands several different virtues, from 
patience, to enable dialogue with different groups and persons; to care, enabling 
commitment to people and projects over time. Creative response also demands the 
practice of the virtue of hope. Hope, as a virtue, involves the capacity to envision 
the future in a positive and creative way. Snyder (2000) suggests that this involves 
the development of pathways (in practice involving negotiation of shared resource), 
achievable targets, and agency. Agency, of course, links us back to responsibility. 
It provides hope in the sense of both people and organisations owning their own 
ideas and values, and also in the sense that it connects to creative action; the agent 
gets things done. Such hope is not based simply on what can be done, but on the 
unconditional worth of the person or organisation. Respect for agency says that you 
are not hopeless (i.e. worthless).
The practice of such virtues through dialogue then precisely enables the 
development of responsibility, both individual and shared. This also suggests a 
more complex view of dialogue, focusing not simply on the development of ideas, 
values or principles but on the practice of virtue and the development of character. 
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Consistent character is key to evidence of integrity. The development of such virtues 
requires the development of a community of dialogue which enables their practise 
(MacIntyre 1981); also important in providing evidence of integrity. 
The focus on virtues once more moves dialogue beyond Habermas’s principle-
centred approach. It is the development of character which enables individuals and 
organisations to handle the ambiguity of social environments, and to hold together 
the different relationships. 
Fifth, this also suggests dialogue that is ongoing and linking plural dialogues. Even 
the core community has internal differences, and dialogue occurs beyond the 
core community. In turn, this suggests that dialogue may occur, pace Habermas, 
beyond ordered frameworks of dialogue, or according to rules. Once more, the 
example of Henry V serves to illustrate this. In the evening before the battle of 
Agincourt (Henry V, 4), Henry (in disguise) locks into dialogue which has been 
developing amongst the troops, dialogue focused on their relationship with the 
king, and suggesting that it was not clear whether the king could be trusted not 
to give himself to ransom, thereby not respecting the sacrifice of the troops in 
previous battles. Henry continues the dialogue in his Crispin’s Day speech, this 
time in role (Henry V, 4.3). He focuses on developing a sense of value, worth and 
mutuality to prepare the troops for the battle against the odds, and then continues 
the dialogue, but now with the French herald, beyond the community. Whilst this 
dialogue is ostensibly about the key practical matter at hand, it also links to the 
dialogue about trust with his troops. He refuses the call for ransom from the herald, 
with his troops as audience and thus still part of that dialogue, thereby reinforcing 
his commitment to them. This suggests that Henry’s continuing accountability 
is located in ongoing dialogue that engages different narratives, and which is 
focused on vision and worth. For Shakespeare, the back drop is a continuing set 
of dialogues, into which the Crispin’s Day speech drops, on honour. Honour is 
precisely connected to worth, and Henry V, and the Henriad as a whole, focus on 
and create dialogue around different views of the basis of honour - from Hotspur 
(honour as personal reputation), Falstaff (honour as being without worth to the 
ordinary man), and Henry V (honour as focused on shared worth and purpose). 
The last of these is precisely what emerges in the Crispin’s Day speech, and is key 
to the motivation of the troops. The dialogue comes to a head in practice and in 
decision making, in this case in battle. However, this is not the result of a systematic 
framework of dialogue, but of leadership which is firstly aware of the different 
dialogues and, secondly, that enables the engagement of the different stakeholders 
in shared dialogues and, thirdly, that enables the different dialogues to focus on 
practice. This requires dynamic and responsive leadership and, in Henry’s case, 
directly addresses purpose, competence (in this case in battle), values and worth 
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(honour), relationships (between the leader and his troops), and the significance of 
the practice in which they are involved. 
This also suggests that dialogue is always with many voices, and that a key part of 
the practice is identifying those voices. Such dialogue is also not simply a tool of 
communication, separate from the identity, meaning and relationships. Sidorkin 
(1999), building on Bakhtin (1981), argues that it is ontological, focused in the 
very being of the person and relationships, enabling the plural identity of the 
person and the organisation to be held together. Moving beyond Levinas (1998), 
this suggests that all dialogue is polyphonic (many voiced), even that with the self. 
This also goes beyond Buber (1942), who argued for the primacy of being present 
in dialogue rather than for rational articulation. It suggests that the articulation 
of rational concepts and arguments, including specific reference to meaning and 
value, are as important to dialogue as any affective understanding. Epley (2014) 
refers to recent research which supports this view, arguing that knowledge of the 
other requires holistic dialogue.
Buber (cf. Anderson 1997), in his critique of Carl Rogers and dialogue in therapy, 
argues that, because there is power imbalance in the therapeutic relationship, 
this cannot lead to a dialogue which is mutual. However, the argument thus far 
suggests that most, if not all relationships, involve an imbalance of power, perceived 
or actual, and that this is a function of difference. Critical dialogue focused on 
agency, accountability and shared liability precisely works through these aspects 
of power, because its holistic engagement has to critically address the power of 
ideas (intellectual power), the power of feeling (affective power), and the power 
of culture5. Again, this is exemplified in Shakespeare’s view of Henry V. The St 
Crispin’s Day speech focuses on mutuality, and re-engagement with core culture,6 
in the context of the huge difference in power and status. This was all in the context 
of responding to plural narratives in relation to the nation, to community, the 
enemy, the future, the family, and so on. Pace Buber, power is addressed precisely 
in dialogue.
The means of addressing that power, and of enabling the development of mutuality, 
are both by good dialogue being modelled and also by the development of formal 
and informal contract. The first of these is focused, for Rogers, on the modelling 
of empathy, congruence and unconditional positive regard, and this would apply 
equally to the leaders of institutions or organisations. The second involves the 
5 All of which can be abused. 
6 Central to this, for Henry, was God-centred kingship, something that left him uncertain, 
given that his father took the throne from Richard II. Hence, dialogues include one with 
God.
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development of community, which gives permission to question and develop 
dialogue. For Henry V, this involves informal contracts where the king gives 
permission to characters to articulate advice or to challenge, and even to give critical 
input.7 His dialogue with the Lord Chief Justice sets this out, as does his treatment 
of Williams (Henry V. 4.4, and 4.8), where he rewards the earlier challenge of the 
soldier with money. As I have suggested elsewhere (Author 2001) in the context 
of teaching and therapy, contract, in the sense of setting out aims, objectives, 
expectations and procedures, is a key aspect of dialogue. This is empowering 
because it enables the person to explicitly articulate and test his or her voice. It 
provides a framework of meaning and behaviour which allows mutual challenge. 
This, in turn, enables the development of critical agency, taking responsibility for 
how the person views their life and worth, and how this life might be developed. 
The other then emerges through the development of their agency, and thus leads to 
learning in all the different levels of responsibility. In this light the development of 
agency is precisely empowerment. 
This also enables the development of shared responsibility, not simply the 
recognition of shared interests or shared values, pace Porter and Kramer (2011). 
The working through of responsibility is also in itself a development of power, 
focused on creative action and hence on the embodiment of responsibility. Far from 
a continual journey towards the other (as in Levinas), this suggests a shared journey 
on which the other is discovered through intentional action. It is the imperative of 
action that moves dialogue forward. The stress on action and dialogue once more 
takes this beyond Levinas and Buber, addressing the embodiment of the different 
relationships through creative practice. The parallels with Habermas and his rules 
of dialogue that are focused in action are, at this stage, close, the major difference 
being once more his focus on rationality, a lack of systematic focus on holistic 
dynamics, and a lack of focus on multiple and ongoing dialogue. There are also 
questions about the nature of the learning experience in the Habermas framework, 
and how the development of virtues relates to this. 
Conclusion 
Solomon (1992) suggests that integrity is not one virtue but a collection of several 
virtues, which come together to help form a coherent character and identity. This 
paper argues that integrity is, rather, focused in the practice of responsibility and its 
three interrelated modes. This requires relating to a complex environment, finding 
the means of relating to different values, but is also focused on a wider sense of 
7 Such contracts can also be formal and also can involves the establishment of boundaries. 
Hence, Henry newly crowned in Henry IV part 2, firmly places Falstaff ’s outside the 
boundary of dialogue (reflecting Falstaff ’s nihilistic perspective). 
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common good, expressed through shared action. Integrity relates to the different 
virtues precisely through the practice of the virtues, enabling the development of the 
three modes of responsibility. Central to this is dialogue, focused on four elements 
of holism and relating to the plural narratives of the social environment over time 
and in relation to practice and identity. I argue that this provides the basis for a 
view of dialogue which deepens and develops the theories of Habermas and others. 
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